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implying that the express representations in trade magazines and
letters to garment manufacturers did not suffice to create an
express warranty. Under what precise circumstances, however,
the media of radio, television, newspaper and direct mail advertising,
either alone or in combination, will constitute express warranties,
in the absence of labels, is another question left unanswered by the
Court.
Thus while the Court uses very broad language in discussing
the tort aspects of a warranty action, 34 it carefully limits the
decision to its facts. The language shows an inclination to abandon
the privity requirement altogether, at least when the interests of
justice demand it; the limitations, a desire to proceed slowly. The
policy of the Court of Appeals is to "be cautious and take one
step at a time." 35 The Court seems to be unnecessarily cautious
in the instant case, for there is no apparent reason for limiting an
express warranty to situations where the remote manufacturer
supplies labels. The language of the decision indicates that the
rule will be extended, but apparently only on an ad hoc basis.

M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TELEGRAPH COMPANY DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW BY STATE JUDGMENT ESCHEATING UNDISBURSED

MONEY ORDER FuIm. - As part of its business Western Union
offers the service of telegraphing money orders. The receiver is
given a note which can be cashed at one of the company's offices.
Some of these notes are never redeemed. At other times the
receiver cannot be located and in attempting to return the money
the sender, also, cannot be located. This money is held on
deposit by the company until its true owner should appear. The
state of Pennsylvania, however, escheated these funds and its right
to do so was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proceeding
lacked due process since Western Union was compelled to relinquish the monies without any assurance that it would not again
be subject to an escheat action by any other state in which it also
did business or that it would not be held liable to a party not

34 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
3 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213
N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961).
1 Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617

(1960).
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bound by the Pennsylvania action. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
Escheat is the right of the state to take control and ownership
of abandoned property or property of a decedent who dies intestate
and without heirs. 2

Although at common law the concept

of

escheat 3 applied only to realty, today it also covers personal
property.4
In order to entertain an action for escheat a court must have
jurisdiction of the res or of the persons interested in the res.
Since at common law. escheat occurred mainly where a decedent died
intestate without heirs, the jurisdictional rules of descent and
distribution applied. Personal property was considered to be located
at the domicile of the owner (nobilia personam sequuntur) and
therefore the court of that state could obtain jurisdiction. r Intangibles, being considered personal property, 6 fell under the same
rule.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century the United States
Supreme Court stated that personal property could achieve a situs
other than at the domicile of the owner.7 This finding left room,
particularly in the area of intangibles, for conflict among the states
on the question of situs of property and ultimately as to the issue
of which state had jurisdiction. The solution to this conflict is
particularly important in the area of escheat.
to be in the
Generally, an escheat proceeding is considered
8
escheating
the
then
If
rem.
in
quasi
or
rem
in
nature of an action
2

University of North Carolina v. City of High Point, 203 N.C. 558, 562,

166 S.E. 511, 513 (1932); Commonwealth ex rel. Reno v. Pennsylvania Co.

for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities, 339 Pa. 513, 516, 15 A.2d 280, 281
(1940).
3 See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S 428, 435-36 (1951).
Under the feudal system it was the right of the lord to retake lands
held by tenure, but later 'this right passed to the king. The notion that
escheat was an element of sovereignty carried over to this country and is

considered a right of the state. Note, Origins and Development of Modern
Escheat, 61 CoLuM. L. Ray. 1319 (1961), which contains an excellent short

history of escheat.
4 In re Lindquist's Estate, 25 Cal. 2d 697, 702, 154 P.2d 879, 882 (1944);
State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 293, 74 A.2d 565, 572 (1950).
5 See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 376-79 (1834). An interesting criticism
of this rule is found in 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 255.2 (1935).
6 Royal Oak Township v. City of Berkley, 309 Mich. 572, 16 N.W.2d 83
(1944); Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Whitehead, 39 Ohio App. 51, 176 N.E. 583
(1930).
7New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U.S. 309 (1899); Railroad Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872).
8 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Christianson
v. King County, 239 U.S. 356, 373 (1915); Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S.
256, 263 (1896); see Northwestern Clearance Co. v. Jennings, 106 Ore. 291,
210 Pac. 884 (1922).
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state is to comply with the demands of due process as set out in
Pennoyer v. Neff,9 it must have jurisdiction over the property and
give notice to the interested parties. It has been argued that an
intangible, being a right or an interest and not a physical thing,
can only be in the jurisdiction of the court when the parties,
whose relationship is the source of such a right, are before the
court. 10 The Supreme Court, however, in Harris v. Balk 11 held
that a Maryland garnishment was entitled to full faith and credit
where Maryland's jurisdiction over the debt of a nonresident
debtor was predicated on jurisdiction over the debtor's debtor.
This decision, in effect, allowed jurisdiction to be taken over an
intangible by obtaining jurisdiction over the "holder," as opposed
to the "owner," of the intangible.
The question of what constitutes sufficient situs to obtain
jurisdiction over an intangible for the purposes of escheat has been
answered in several ways by the states. Some have adopted the
common-law rule that the property follows the owner. 12 Others
have followed the reasoning of Harris v. Balk 13 and predicated4
jurisdiction upon control over the holder of the intangible.'
Where the holder is a corporation, however, there is disagreement
as to whether the state of incorporation 11 or the state where a
substantial amount of business is done 1 should be allowed to
escheat.
In Security Savings Bank v. California17 the Supreme Court
upheld the escheat of unclaimed bank accounts in a case where
the bank was incorporated in the escheating state and the depositors
were last known to have been domiciled there. Again, in Anderson
995 U.S. 714 (1877).
I0Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948). See Beale, The Exercise
of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REv.
This article, along with Professor Beale's position
107, 115-16 (1913).
on the subject of jurisdiction over intangibles, is discussed in Com-

ment, Full Faith and Credit as a Bar to Multiple Escheat of Intangibles,

59 M IcH. L. REv. 756 (1961).
11
2 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
3 In re Hull Copper Co., 46 Ariz. 270, 50 P.2d 560 (1935); California
v. State Tax Comm'n, 55 Wash. 2d 155, 346 P.2d 1006 (1959) ; In re Lyon's
Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615 (1933).
13 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
14 In the Matter of Estate of Menschefrend, 283 App. Div. 463, 128
N.Y.S2d 738 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd inen., 8 N.Y.2d 1093, 170 N.E.2d 902,
208 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1960), cert. denied sub nom., Brown v. Lefkowitz, 365
U.S. 842 (1961); In re Rapoport's Estate, 317 Mich. 291, 26 N.W.2d
777 (1947).
15 State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 309, 74 A.2d 565, 578-79
(1950).
16 Schoener v. Continental Motors Corp., 362 Mich. 303, 106 N.W.2d 774
(1961), 7 WAYm L. REv. 597.
17263 U.S. 282 (1923).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 36

Nat'l Bank v. Luckett ' 8 the Court affirmed such action. Later,
when New York escheated unpaid insurance funds owing its
residents by companies incorporated outside the state, the Court in
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,'9 affirmed, holding that
jurisdiction over the insurance companies was properly obtained
on .the basis of the "substantial business contact" theory 2 0 From
these cases it might be concluded that the Court will allow an
escheat where there is jurisdiction over the holder and the action
is prosecuted in
the state of the last known domicile of the owner of
2
the intangible. 1
In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey2 2 the Supreme Court
was faced with the problem of determining the legality of New
Jersey's escheat of unpaid dividends held by a domiciliary corporation and owed to nonresident shareholders. The holder of
these dividends, the Standard Oil Company, objected to the escheat
claiming a deprivation of due process in that it was not protected from the claims of the shareholders whose monies were
escheated and who were not parties to the action. It maintained
that notice by publication was inadequate notice to the parties
whose interest was being divested, that the state's action was a
violation of the contract rights of the parties and that the court
lacked jurisdiction because the property was not located in New
Jersey. On the basis of the Security Savings Bank and the
Anderson Natl Bank cases the Court found that personal service
upon the holder coupled with notice by publication to the non23
resident shareholders satisfied the requirements of due process.
It further held that, since there was no contract between the appellant and its shareholders as to the disposition of unclaimed
dividends, the escheat did not violate the contract clause of the
federal constitution. 24 Addressing itself to the question of situs
the Court said:
Situs of an intangible is fictional but control over parties whose judicially
coerced action can make effective rights created by the chose in action
enables the court with such control to dispose of the rights of the parties
to the intangible. Since such power exists through the state's jurisdiction
of the parties whose dealings have created the chose in action, we need not
rely on the concept that the asset represented by the certificate or dividend
is where the obligor is found. The rights of the owners of the stock

18321 U.S. 233 (1944).
19333
U.S. 541 (1948).
2
oInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21 See Note, Full Faith and Credit as a Bar to Multiple Escheat of
Intangibles, 59 MicHr. L. Rv. 756, 768 (1961).
22341 U.S. 428 (1951).
234 Id. at 433-35.
2 1d. at 435-36.
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dividends come within the reach of the court by notice, i.e., service by
publication, the rights of [Standard Oil Co.] by personal service. 25

It would seem, therefore, that this decision taken in consideration
with the earlier cases would uphold an escheat where there is
personal service upon the holder of the intangible. This would
be a sufficient seizure of the res to allow the court to continue the
action as one in the nature of quasi in rem.
The Court in Standard Oil, although not specifically faced
with the problem, considered the possibility of a "double escheat"
and, by way of dictum, stated that "the debts and demands represented by the stock and dividends having been taken from the
appellant company by a valid judgment of New Jersey, the same
debts or demands against appellant cannot be taken by another
state. The Full Faith and Credit Clause bars any such double
escheat."' 26
Both Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, however,
in their dissenting opinions concluded that such would not be
a bar to a second escheat by another state with a valid claim,
27
since that state was not a party to the escheat action.
The Court in the case presently under consideration came
to the same conclusion as the dissent in Standard Oil. The fact
that New York had already escheated part of the funds which
Pennsylvania was attempting to seize indicated the nature of the
problem before it. The Standard Oil decision was distinguished
on the basis of a statement in that earlier opinion 2 that the
claim of no other state was before that Court, and therefore no
real controversy between states was there presented. No reference
was made to the earlier Court's dictum that full faith and credit
was a bar to a "double escheat," a position from which this Court
seems to have withdrawn.
This Court reasoned that where the state court's jurisdiction
is based on the presence of property within the state, the holder
is deprived of due process if he "is compelled to relinquish it
without assurance that he will not be held liable again in another
jurisdiction or in a suit brought by a claimant who is not bound
by the first judgment." 29 Here New York claimed that the
property was within its jurisdiction and subject to its escheat.
Since New York could not be brought within the jurisdiction

25d at 439-40.
26 Id at 443.
27 Id. at 443, 445 (dissenting opinion).
28The Court in Standard Oil said: "The claim of no other state to this
property is before us and, of course, determination of any right of a
claimant state against New Jersey for the property escheated by New
Jersey
2 9 must await presentation here." Id. at 443.
Westem Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961).
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of the Pennsylvania court, and therefore be bound by its determination, the appellant was deprived of due process.
It would thus seem that a state could not escheat unclaimed
property in any case where another state had a just claim that
the intangible was present, at least in part, within its borders,
due process being satisfied only by jurisdiction over the entire
res or all the individuals and states interested in the res. The
Court suggested two possible solutions:30 first, an original action
in the Supreme Court, and second, an action in the district courts,
probably in the nature of an interpleader. An original action, as
maintained in Texas v. Florida,31 would solve the due process
problem by binding all parties in interest. Possible objections to
such a solution are twofold: the Court is not bound to take
jurisdiction in all conflicts between states 32 and, considering the
growing number of escheat statutes, it would seem impractical for
the Court to handle this increasing volume of litigation.
The Court's proposed solution in the form of a district court
33
action was based on its determination in Massachusetts v. Missouri,
where it was suggested that Masschusetts bring the action. In the
usual escheat case, however, the holder is a private person. It
might be seriously questioned whether the interpleading of a state
by such a holder would violate the eleventh amendment of the
federal constitution.
Another possible solution, not suggested by the Court, may be
34
found in the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act,
3 5
which has been adopted by several states.
It is an attempt to
cover, in a single comprehensive act, the escheat of all possible
forms of unclaimed intangible property. The heart of this act is
found in section 10, which provides for reciprocal action on the
part of the states interested in escheating the same property. It
reads, in part, as follows:
If specific property which is subject to [particular sections of the act] is

held for or owed or distributable to an owner whose last known address

a0 Id. at 79.
31306 U.S. 398 (1939).
32 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939); Alabama v.
Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934).
33308 U.S. 1, 20 (1939).
34 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF COMMISSIONERS

ON

136 (1954). This proposed statute is "custodial" in
nature
in that title to the property never vests in the state.
35
UNIFORM STATE LAWS

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-351

§§1500-27;

to -378 (1956);

§§717.01-.30 (Supp.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

1961); IDAHO CODE
(Supp. 1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 141 §§ 101-30
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-22-1 to -29 (Supp. 1961);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 98.302 to .436 (1957) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-44-1 to -28
(Supp. 1961); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-210.1-.30 (Supp. 1960); WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 63.28.070 to .920 (1958).
ANN.

FLA.

STAT.

§§14-501 to -531

ANN.
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is in another state by a holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of that
state, the specific property is not presumed abandoned in this state . . .

if:
(a) It may be claimed as abandoned or escheated under the laws of
such other state; and
(b) The laws of such other state make reciprocal [provisions similar
to the provisions made under this statute].36

If, under the circumstances of the present case, both New
York and Pennsylvania had adopted the Uniform Act (and considering for the moment that no other state had a claim) the
problems with which the Court was confronted might well have
37
been avoided. Pursuant to sections 9 and 13 of the act,
New York, if that were the state in which the money was held,
would have the right to escheat. But by operation of section 10,
New York would be obliged to give up its interest to all monies
owing to residents of Pennsylvania, which monies could then be
escheated by Pennsylvania. Since all interested parties would be
before the court, Western Union would thereby be secured against
a "double escheat."
The solution offered by the Uniform Act can only be effective,
however, when all states interested in the intangible have enacted
the law. While there has been criticism of the Uniform Act, for
example, the possible overreaching by states to persons or property
beyond its proper control, 38 in general it is quite satisfactory.
The growing number of states passing escheat laws makes a
solution to the problem imperative.8 9 It would seem that the
enactment of the Uniform Act by these states might, to a large
extent, offer that solution.

DELAY
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SENTENCING--UNREASONABLE
IN IMPOSING SENTENCE CAUSED TRIAL COURT TO LOSE JURISDIC-

38

HANDBOOK

OF THE NATIONAL

UNIFORM STATE LAWS 144-45 (1954)

37 Section 9 provides:

CONFEREN cE OF COMMISSIONERS
(emphasis added).

ON

"All intangible personal property, not otherwise

covered by this act . . . that is held or owing in this state in the ordinary
course of the holder's business . . . is presumed abandoned." Id. at 144.
Section 13 provides for the delivery of all property, presumed abandoned
in §§ 2 to 9 of the act, to the state. Id. at 148.
791, 805-08
38Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw.

(1960).
3 See McBridge, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus. LAw. 1062 (1959); Note, A Uniform Disposition
of Unclaimed Property Act for Colorado, 29 ROCKY MT. L. Ray. 102

(1956).

